Original: Colonel Cassad
Translated by Alexander Fedotov / Edited by @GBabeuf
Regarding yesterday’s information from Zot’ev that Surkov may be removed from the Donbass. With respect to the sweeping out of the current composition of curators, the information is confirmed.
Today all the “curators” in the PRs [the People’s Republics –ed.] have been dismissed. I do not know yet exactly about Surkov (though there are reports from the Ukrainian side that he was removed), but all the executors and “supervisors” were removed from the game. Let’s see whether new people are coming and who they will be. According to some reports, supervision is passing to “the office” [the FSB –trans.] as was the case in the spring and early summer of 2014. In general, the next reformatting of Russia’s policy in the Donbass has begun. Some people believe that this may be due to a possible escalation of the conflict with Ukraine, others talk about an escalation of the struggle for the increasingly scanty budgets of the Russian Federation.
Actually, apart from Zhuchkovsky, this information was confirmed by my sources in the DPR and the LPR with whom I discussed the topic yesterday and today. It was also confirmed from Donetsk that the persons responsible for “ideological development” in the republic have left the DPR. Actually the same applies to a number of persons involved in curating of economic issues in Lugansk—the reshuffle is associated with the case of Lyamin & Co. (as I understand it, Lyamin gave interesting testimony to the MSS*), so this corruption scandal is really echoed in Moscow. In general, there is quite a serious reformatting of the “supervisory bodies”. Regarding Surkov himself, there is not 100% evidence that he was removed; some say that he was fired, others that he was not. But, remarkably, three very different people who are unlikely to be somehow linked together named Kozak as the surname of the person to whom it is likely that responsibility for economic issues in the DPR and the LPR will be switched. One possible option is that Kozak—or some other person to whom responsibility for the economy is to be switched—will operate in parallel with Surkov, who will maintain the “Minsk process”. We will see whether it is true. In any case, major changes are underway. Whose positions will strengthen or weaken will become clear from the new layouts in the camp of the curators of the DPR and the LPR, when some leave and others arrive. The reaction of Surkov’s inner circle about the problems arising for their “boss” was quite indicative, but not amazing.
*Ministry of State Security (MGB in Russian) [trans.]
Is it possible that these are part of early moves to eventually re-integrate Donbas with Russia?
Unlikely. It may be a number of things: a Moscow power struggle between anti- and pro-appeasement factions; an inconsequential and regular turnover of ‘managers’; an attempt to prevent or punish corruption, etc. A lot will depend on what in fact happens. It’s unlikely Surkov will lose control, though; so Minsk appeasement of the junta will likely continue.
I am not privy to the inner workings of the Kremlin, except that I get weekly updates from the Presidential site and I see NO signs of a “power struggle”, nor with the fact that Comrade Putin has a 90% approval rating.
Vladimir Putin is my kind of socialist and I do not think that you have any understanding of what is going on.
Of course I might be wrong, but I would rather trust Russian sources than you.
The Donbass is already integrating with the Russian Federation and any interpretation of “autonomy” under the Minsk agreements for the regions (yes, all the regions!) of what was the Ukraine would tend towards complete autonomy. This integration and the general question of autonomy for all the regions, the fascist delusions and oligarchs holding sway in what can now be called Banderastan are serious stumbling blocks to implementation of autonomy under Minsk I and II; unless there is a final solution at least to the fascist problem in Banderastan there can be no Minsk, and integration of the Donbass with the Russian Federation can be assumed to continue, even given attempts in good faith by the Russian Federation to slow the process.
From what I know, you are completely correct.
For all that I study this subject, the notions discussed here of the continuing integration of Donbass into the Russian Federation come as a surprise. While I understand Zakharchenko has said he would like to integrate with the RF, it seems that Putin is dedicated to making this impossible by pursuing Minsk. Is Putin also involved this process of integration, if it exists, and therefore lying when he says he supports the “territorial Integrity of Ukraine”? Or is Putin against actually this process of integration, and telling the world the truth? Or possibly this whole idea of Donbass integration into the RF is wishful thinking at this point? Some analysts such as Vladimir Suchan and Alexander Dugin are loudly proclaiming that Putin has betrayed Donbass. Are these observers completely misguided? I had personally assumed Putin was truthful about his support of Minsk because he is trying to avoid sparking World War III.
Well, the shameful murder of Pavel Dremov screams loud that nothing has changed, at least in Lugansk (whose leadership’s difference with that of the rest of the Ukraine is very hard to discern)!