Military-Strategic Resumé of 2023: Prospects?

Original article: Dmitry Stefanovich / Translated by @GBabeuf

Researcher at the Center for International Security at the National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations named after E.M. Primakov

The year has been difficult – it’s a corny line, but it’s true. Let’s start with the main thing: the “new (non)normal” has finally taken shape, and they are trying to adapt to it with varying degrees of success. Although, of course, in some areas, some actors retain the desire to live as their grandparents lived. But alas, no, if you just ignore current events and changes, that won’t make them go away.

On the military-political track, there is a continuation of the collapse of the framework of traditional arms control (suspension of the 2010 START Treaty, de-ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, final withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe). However, relative restraint is demonstrated both in terms of political signals and the preservation of individual elements (for example, notifications of ICBM launches), and in the military-technical field: the activity of testing new strategic weapons systems is routine in nature (and for some “new products”, for example, the promising heavy ICBM “Sarmat” is completely too leisurely). Even the traditional autumn exercises of the Russian strategic deterrence forces looked deliberately modest and were conducted with an emphatically retaliatory scenario.

All this is happening against the background of a very open increase in the nuclear missile potential of the PRC (and the DPRK) and corresponding discussions in the United States. The published report of the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission was perhaps the most overtly formulated set of proposals for maintaining American dominance. The quality of development of these proposals remains very modest, but the trend toward, if not stimulation of, then certainly participation in the arms race, including nuclear ones, is taking shape. Another thing is that the document completely ignores possible retaliatory steps from China and Russia, but, fortunately, this is not yet our headache.

A special place is occupied by the increasingly formalised calls of American colleagues for so-called “compartmentalisation,” that is, separating the issue of arms control and “nuclear risks” from the generally “lunar” landscape of Russian-American relations. The official Russian position on the impossibility of such an approach in the current conditions has been voiced more than once, but I would like to emphasize that even in Jake Sullivan’s keynote speech, the readiness to resuscitate this track was combined with statements about the need to maintain US superiority in all, let’s say, “strategic non-nuclear” areas. It seems self-evident that this approach to the “balance of power” does not appear to be a stabilising one, to put it mildly. True, so far, ensuring American superiority has encountered technological obstacles, at least in certain areas, for example, in the development and testing of hypersonic weapons. Although, of course, the first flight of the promising B-21 heavy bomber once again confirmed the status of the United States as a leading military superpower.

At the same time, the format of the “nuclear five”, which is currently chaired by Russia, remains operational. Of course, this is in no way a replacement or alternative to either traditional arms control or, for example, the agenda of the UN Security Council (even though the list of permanent members of which is exactly the same). However, this platform is very useful for “checking notes,” including regarding perceived threats. During the Western “presidencies” of recent years, the agenda was somewhat restricted to discussing nuclear risks, however, despite the importance of this area, the relevance of all three pillars of the NPT remains: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. And it is the “nuclear five” that bears special responsibility.

Speaking about the issues of the arms race, one cannot help but touch upon space—or rather, even what is commonly called on international platforms the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). A split has clearly emerged in this area—more precisely, in this space. The problem of preventing the weaponization of outer space is being actively replaced by theses about the need for “sustainability” and “responsible behaviour”, to the point that it is being proposed that PAROS as an approach should be recognized as an outdated “framework” that must be abandoned. Perhaps, in immediate terms, a sharp escalation in outer space is unlikely, but there is understandable concern about the formation of political conditions for dividing space activities into “right” and “wrong.”

Returning to nuclear topics—the internal Russian discussion on scenarios, consequences and possible conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, the interim outcome of which was summed up by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Valdai Forum in 2023, became, perhaps, the most substantive public discussion of this issue in many years. The discussion attracted great attention from foreign observers. There is no doubt that issues of nuclear deterrence (and of strategic deterrence more generally) will remain one of the main topics for the domestic scientific and expert community; and for foreign ones too.

In a purely military sense, for obvious reasons, the main event for Russia was a successful—let’s not be afraid of this word—strategic defensive operation within the framework of the Special Military Operation (SMO). The political dimension of what happened is still being formed, but opponents are clearly puzzled. Of course, the very fact that in the armed conflict with the Ukraine we are playing “on defence” makes one think about many things, albeit with all the necessary reservations about the unprecedented military-technical and economic support of the so-called West. At the same time, talk about how the Russian general-purpose forces would be weakened as a result of the SMO has somewhat died down: indeed, discussions about “weakening” look strange in the presence of an army that is fighting in a real way, and a military-industrial complex that is increasing production, not to mention the sustainability of the national economy and finance. Which, of course, does not in any way exclude questions about certain actions and decisions, but we will engage in public debriefing after the end of hostilities.

The actions of Western countries and, first and foremost, of Western military industry are not well understood. Against the background of very emotional conversations about the need to increase the production of all types of weapons, military and special equipment, and, first of all, various means of destruction—that is, ammunition—in practice, the successes have been very limited. Perhaps there are not enough resources (including labour), perhaps there is no readiness for significant investments without guarantees of long-term demand. But it is Western military assistance that remains the key factor preventing the demilitarisation of the Ukraine.

The situation is completely different in the Far East and in the Indo-Pacific as a whole: the Korean Peninsula looks almost like a centre of military industry; Australia, Japan, and India are actively involved in the production of ammunition; and China (including Taiwan) clearly demonstrates its readiness for “large-scale forms” of armed confrontation. This also applies to the strategic sphere: the US-Korea Washington Declaration [between the USA and the Republic of Korea –ed.] may become a new standard for allied relations in the field of planning and supporting operations of nuclear forces, and the trilateral format for exchanging information on missile launches of a potential enemy—launched at the end of this year between Washington, Seoul and Tokyo—is openly positioned, among other things, as a tool to contain Beijing. Two years ago, the author of these lines, in a similar summary, noted that everyone had stopped being shy, and that 2022 would not allow anyone to become bored. The scale of the unfolding drama exceeded the wildest forecasts. For 2024, we will limit ourselves to the modest hope of surviving until the next New Year’s summing up.