Special military procrastination

Originally posted on SLG Analytica

The following is offered here as a reflection of the thinking of circles close to the Kremlin, and not necessarily as reflecting positions of which this channel “approves”. One thing that emerges, though, is that these circles are fully aware a) that the current forms of warfare at the front will not lead to any kind of “victory” over Ukraine and that b) those forms of warfare are a deliberate choice based on an unwillingness to achieve a decisive outcome—unlike the apostles of “attritional warfare” who have convinced themselves that it will take them all the way to Kiev and are busy reviving discredited military strategists to defend such a position.

About the Cunning Plan

Original Article: Global Affairs / Translated by: @Gbabeuf

The military conflict with Ukraine caused an emotional wave of rare strength in our society, and throughout the world. Dashing cavalry advances, which gave either side hopes of a quick victory, gave way to immobile positional confrontations. The elation of many was replaced by resignation and burnout—it seems that there is a hopeless dead end ahead, and that the Special Military Operation (SMO) has become aimless and has been reduced to storming useless Ukrainian villages and nameless forest plantations. It appears, however, that this is not the case.

In a previous note we talked about why we cannot advance in Ukraine on a broad front, occupy Kharkov, the Russian city of Odessa, and so on. And here’s another reason: we don’t really want to. Or rather, President Putin doesn’t want to.

He doesn’t want to yet.

If Ukraine does not suddenly crumble to such an extent that it can be defeated with the currently available forces, we will indeed be faced with months, or even years, of trench warfare—but the hassle is not pointless. According to Putin, it should end either with a large scale deal with the West, or with a large scale campaign of the Russian army on the territory controlled by Kiev. This time with the most decisive goals.

Sovereign opportunism
Since coming to power 24 years ago, Putin has developed the image of an uncompromising fighter against the enemy, and observers are inclined to apply his promise to “flush down the toilet” to everything in sight, including Ukraine. However, in relations with the West and with regards to Ukraine, Putin has always been a man of compromise. The principle of Putin’s policy in the Ukrainian (as, indeed, in the entire post-Soviet) direction has been: apply pressure to reach an agreement. From the gas wars under Yushchenko to the Black Sea Fleet deal under Yanukovych, from the Minsk agreements under Poroshenko and to the Istanbul epic under Zelensky, Putin never beat Ukraine to death, instead limiting himself to slapping his opponents, hoping to put their brains in place.

This approach is often criticized, but Putin, like the Russian élites in general, fundamentally and organically considered Ukraine a separate country and, unlike terrorist Ichkeria, always recognized its—i.e. Ukraine’s—right to exist. In this paradigm, Kiev itself must accept an offer that cannot be refused, but as an insurance policy, Putin over and over again created a Plan B: in order not to become dependent on Ukraine in gas affairs, bypass pipelines were built; in parallel with the agreement on the fleet, the Crimean operation was developed (carried out in March-April 2014), and so on.

The patient sweats before dying
In the first years, Putin negotiated with the Ukrainian élites directly, then—as Kiev lost its independence—alongside Europe (the agreements signed on the second attempt in Minsk) and, apparently, behind the scenes, with the United States. The agreements worked worse and worse every year, but with the chosen approach it was hardly possible to achieve more. Moreover, seen in isolation, the Minsk agreements were a kind of diplomatic triumph: in the end, having been approved by the UN Security Council, Minsk-2 became an international legal treaty of the highest order, binding on Ukraine.

The backup plan in case of the failure of Minsk was the SMO in its original form: first, several months of military alarm, and then a police operation at maximum speed in order to force Kiev to accept Moscow’s conditions. In Istanbul in March 2022, it was proposed to involve the United States, Great Britain and China as the highest guarantors. China seemed not to mind, but the West flatly refused, and Putin began to wait for his counterparts to fight among themselves, while keeping Ukraine in a forceful grip, now strengthening and now weakening that grip.

It cannot be said that this does not work at all: the West has armed the Armed Forces of Ukraine as best it could (and without fanaticism, such as would be massive deliveries of long-range missiles), but has not yet taken irreversible steps such as admitting Ukraine to NATO; and the severity of anti-Russian sanctions is compensated by the non-binding nature of their implementation. Whether by secret agreement or by itself, after two years another balance has emerged: the West does not allow Ukraine to collapse, but does not provoke escalation, and Russia has pushed Ukraine to its knees, but does not finish it off.

Special military procrastination
We have noted more than once that Russia is preparing for a major military escalation. The military-industrial complex is being promoted, the army is expanding, and a deep mobilization reform is being carried out. However, so far, neither in word nor in deed has Putin demonstrated a desire to go ahead with this escalation. On the contrary, signals are being sent about readiness for negotiations, a defensive game is underway at the front, and the intensity of long-range bombing is even decreasing.

In Ukraine, everything is happening according to the scenario we outlined at the end of August: the West acts with inertia and gives Ukraine just enough not to die, while at the same time stoking anger about the failures of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and sending its own cautious signals about readiness for negotiations; and all this against the backdrop of relatively sluggish military activity.

However, the positions of the parties are still terribly far from each other. Russia still needs Ukraine to stop acting as a military and ideological battering ram directed against it (this is what is hidden under the terms “demilitarization” and “denazification”), while the West is offering a simple freeze without obligations, not wanting to discuss the problem on its merits.

Plan A, Plan B
The Kremlin’s scenario for the coming year could be this: maintaining the current intensity of fighting, slowly advancing in the Donbass and depleting Ukraine, demonstrating to the West the firmness of the Russian position and the futility of their hopes for a military victory. The offer, which the West cannot refuse, looks, in essence, like this: either you retreat from Ukraine, or we smash it as a state and eliminate the threat without any formal order.

If Ukraine does not crumble in the coming months, the current relative calm may well last until the US elections at the end of 2024. In this case, the deal will be offered to the new administration, whoever that may be. Putin has already done this: he held out the Minsk epic until Zelensky’s elections and only when he was convinced of his inability to negotiate did he launch the SMO.

Thus, military escalation will become another insurance policy for various life scenarios: in the absence of substantive agreements, a major attack with decisive goals will begin within the framework of the SMO, and if it is possible to conclude a deal on the demilitarization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine according to the Istanbul principles and the military neutrality of Kiev, an unrestrained Russian military operation will hang like a sword of Damocles over Ukraine in case of attempts to change the status quo.

Putin himself also made hints about such a scenario: at a memorable meeting with military officers in early June 2023, he mentioned a “second campaign against Kiev” and that it would require a new mobilization. We can judge the timing from the words of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu: by the end of 2024, the main tasks for army construction and the development of the military-industrial complex must be completed. According to budget plans, 2024 also marks the peak of national defence spending, and the result will need to be somehow put to use.

A marker of preparation for the aforementioned “great campaign” will be a sharp change in official rhetoric. There will be a grand, nationwide undertaking ahead, so military propaganda will have to come out in full force.

However, if our conclusions are correct, this is a fallback scenario, and mobilization is also a fallback scenario. For Putin, it is more important to conclude a grand deal with the West, and not to destroy Kiev: in the end, it is for the sake of such a deal that the SMO is being conducted, and the physical reduction of Ukraine is a side effect. If it works, Ukraine has a chance to become more like Georgia—and for Ukraine, this would probably be the best fate.

Here and now, a deal is impossible, but after the failure of the counter-offensive, the West sends money and weapons increasingly grudgingly and reluctantly to maintain its client in its current, not very good, shape. If the trend does not change, Ukraine’s chances of resisting the Russian onslaught will fade with each passing month, and with them the West’s hope of starving out Putin.